ABSTRACT: I resolve an argument over "flat" versus "dimensioned" theories of realization. The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a partwhole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that the two types of theory complement one another, even on the same range of scientific cases. I illustrate the point with two popular functionalist versions of flat and dimensioned positions -causal-role functionalism and a functional analysis by decomposition -that combine into a larger picture I call "comprehensive functional realization." I also respond to some possible objections to this synthesis of functionalist views.
I resolve an argument over "flat" versus "dimensioned" theories of realization.
The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a part-whole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that the two types of theory complement one another, even on the same range of 
I. Flat and Dimensioned Positions
According to a flat view, (I) the realized and realizing properties are possessed by the same individual (a token identity condition), and (II) the causal powers that individuate the realized property are a subset of or otherwise contributed by the causal powers bestowed upon an individual by the realizing property (a matching causal powers condition).
1 Several theories fall under this category. Gillett (2003: 593) (FRR) a property G realizes a property F if and only if some object x instantiates F and G, F is the property of having some property that occupies a causal-role R, and G occupies role R.
The position is flat, since the same object instantiates both causal-role and occupant properties, as expressed by condition (I). Moreover, the idea of the realizing property occupying the role of the realized property implies the requisite match in causal powers, as expressed by condition (II). As Gillett explains: "Under the flat view one property instance contributes all the powers individuative of the realized property -the realizer property instance thus literally plays the very causal role that individuates the realized property " (2003: 593) . Parenthetically, one might wonder how a second-order functionalist theory could be metaphysically "flat," as Gillett describes, given that philosophers have understood it to imply a hierarchy of distinct ontological levels in nature (e.g., Lycan 1987: 37-38 ). Yet one must distinguish "property orders" from the "causal levels" implicated by the powers that a property can bestow upon an individual.
Kim makes this distinction by pointing out that while first-order and second-order properties are possessed by the same individual, the causal powers that make a difference in levels are bestowed upon different individuals in the macro/micro hierarchy, illustrated by the set of causal powers associated with a table having a mass of ten kilograms versus the sets of powers associated with the table's individual micro-constituents having lesser masses (Kim, 1998: 82) . As a result, one may say that the second-order functionalist position is ontologically ordered but causally flat.
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Now the contrasting dimensioned view of realization affirms that (I*) the realized and realizing properties are possessed by an individual and its constituent parts, respectively (a mereological condition), and (II*) the realized and realizing properties bestow upon their individuals distinct causal powers suited to the different albeit compositionally-related individuals that possess them (a compositional powers condition). 4 Gillett (2003: 598-599) says that Ned Block's and Jerry Fodor's discussions of multiple realizability imply a dimensioned view of realization. Indeed many were explicit. For example, Cummins subsumed realization under a general theory that explains the instantiation of a property in a kind of system S by "the properties of S's components and their mode of organization " (1983: 15) . That is the mereology of a dimensioned perspective.
In fact, this mereology is central to the more publicized species of a property instantiation theory introduced to the philosophical community by Fodor (1968) and developed by Cummins (1975) , namely, a functional analysis according to which higherlevel functional properties or associated capacities possessed by a system decompose into lower-level sub-capacities and ultimately simple mechanistic-level processes (the more basic realizing parts and their properties). Functional decomposition is composition is reverse. Therefore as long as the functional properties in question are associated with causal capacities, and hence plausibly tied to causal powers, the resulting functional analysis counts as a dimensioned theory of realization. I present this species of the dimensioned perspective, which I call functional part-whole realization, more formally as follows:
(FPR) properties P 1 ,…,P n realize a property F if and only if there is an object x that instantiates a functional property F, there are objects y 1 , …, y n that instantiate P 1 ,…,P n , y 1 , …, y n are the proper parts of x, and, necessarily, for any x and any y 1 , …, y n , if y 1 , …, y n are the proper parts of
x, then if y 1 , …, y n have P 1 ,…,P n then x has F. This is a "core idea" of functional part-whole realization because it contains no reference to familiar metaphysical supplements, such as a complex aggregate of the parts that is coincident with x, or a complex structural property G that could be identified as a role-player for the functional property F.
II. The Alleged Conflict
Gillett believes that the flat and dimensioned theories conflict with one another.
Specifically, he refers to a conflict with Lycan's own version of a dimensioned theory in which the capacities of homunculi decompose into the lesser capacities of sub-system homunculi. To better understand the larger picture according to which both flat and dimensioned functional theories are true, consider again Gillett's paradigm scientific case of the diamond. Speaking flatly, the diamond is token identical with a complex instance COMBO of carbon atoms that possesses the role-playing lattice-structure property G that realizes the diamond's macro-hardness property F. 9 The type of lattice structure that results from the bonding of individual atoms is a broad structural property possessed by the diamond/COMBO, not the individual carbon atoms. But this is not the whole story, or rather it is just a flat story about the whole object. There is also a complementary dimensioned account that addresses how that object is determined by its parts and how its causal powers are built up from those of its component parts. Indeed, the flat functionalist story says only that a second-order property F is associated with a causal role and that a first-order physical property G plays that role. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Endicott, 2007: 230) , this does not indicate how the first-order role-player property G is able to occupy the causal role associated with the second-order functional property F. In order to understand that, one would need a deeper story about how the role-player G and its instances are themselves determined via the mereology of a dimensioned theory. Thus COMBO'S role-playing lattice-structure property G is explained by the accumulative powers of more basic properties P 1 -P n of the constituent atoms a 1 -a n .
Compare a familiar scientific paradigm in the philosophy of mind. There is a particular computer SYSTEM of engineering components that is token identical with a mind and which displays a role-playing property G, say, having a structure of electronic logic gates. This role-playing property serves to realize a mental property F, say, processing a disjunctive argument. The computer SYSTEM is the object within the domain computer engineering that possesses the complex structural property of logic gates, not the individual component circuits, but it possesses that complex property by virtue of the capacities of the several individual circuits. So the SYSTEM's role-playing structure of logic gates G is explained by the accumulative powers of the more basic
properties P 1 -P n of the engineering components a 1 -a n in a mereologically dimensioned way. I call this larger picture "comprehensive functional realization," which is a mix of flat causal-role realization and dimensioned functional realization. It can be illustrated as follows:
The causal level L represents a pattern of relations of the kind causal-role functionalists use to define their target properties, in the philosophy of mind, the intralevel causal transitions between types of inputs, internal computations, and behavioral outputs. This causal-level also includes structural properties like G, since they play the causal role of functional properties like F (this level therefore includes the complex role-playing tokens that are identical with s, like COMBO). Causal level L-1 then represents a pattern of relations of the kind that exist between the mereological parts of the instances of F and G, the individual subsystems or molecules or atoms that compose the system s and determine its powers by the contributions of the several properties P 1 -P n .
Parenthetically, one could dispense with the flat theory's token identities and tell the same compatibilist story in terms of a weaker relation of material constitution with regard to a coincident object, for the relation between objects like the diamond and coincident objects like COMBO is still distinct from the dimensioned relation between those wholes/aggregates and their individual carbon atoms. In other words, there are still two stories that one can combine in the way suggested for comprehensive functional realization. Hence a coincident-friendly version would remain what is depicted in Figure   1 , save that the causal level L would now involve the "instantiation of F by role-player G in system s and its coincident aggregate s′ respectively."
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In any event, since two concepts of realization are in play, the flat and dimensioned, and since both the role-player G and the more basic properties P 1 -P n have been called "realizations" with respect to the realized property F, it might be helpful to call the structural property G the "realizing role-playing" property and the more basic properties P 1 -P n the "realizing part" properties. But however they are labeled, on the larger compatibilist picture of comprehensive functional realization, the part properties jointly determine the role-playing property which in turn determines the functional property. In other words, on this picture realization is a three-place relation ' … realizes … in virtue of …':
(CFR) a role-playing property G realizes a functional property F in a system s in virtue of more basic realizing part properties P 1 -P n possessed by s's subsystem parts a 1 -a n .
I will have more to say about comprehensive functional realization when I consider some possible objections. But first I want to highlight some areas of agreement within the philosophical literature.
IV. Common Ground for Agreement
Many philosophers accept the two aspects of comprehensive functional realization: the idea of flat functional roles and occupants as well as the idea of a dimensioned functional metaphysics. For example, as noted already, Fodor famously supports a dimensioned functional analysis that proceeds by a decomposition of functional capacities. But he also defends the flat causal-role account of mental states. As he says:
The intuition that underlies functionalism is that what determines which kind a mental particular belongs to is its causal role in the mental life of the organism. Functional individuation is individuation in respect of aspects of causal role; for purposes of psychological theory construction, only its causes and effects are to count in determining which kind a mental particular belongs to (1981: 11).
So causal-role functionalism concerns matters of individuation and thus it addresses the kind of thing in question -what is being realized. But functional decomposition addresses the connection between the functional property that has a roleplayer and the underlying subsystem types and physical mechanisms -how the functional property and its role-player are realized by the more basic part properties of the subsystems. Of course Fodor does not say that the two functional theories are theories of realization. Like many others in decades past, he was content to leave the idiom of realization largely as an undefined primitive (save any constraints imposed by its usage, for example, to express some kind of determination or dependency between special and general science properties). Commitment to a functionalist theory is not ipso facto commitment to a functionalist theory of realization, since one could be a functionalist about items in a particular domain and believe that their realization is by virtue of something else, say, a mapping relation, or some form of supervenience, or subsets of causal powers, and so on. This is how Block views early nonreductive functionalists, for he articulates their position as a second-order functionalist theory but maintains that they held a mapping view of realization (1996: 207) . But whatever their view, functionalists However, since he is committed to the same two functional components, Lycan's view is indistinguishable from comprehensive functional realization if one assumes that the mapping relation is satisfied (which many believe to be trivial) and as long as the designated functions are given a teleological reading.
I also note that my compatibilist sketch of comprehensive functional realization comports well with what Cummins says about the integration of transition theories and
property instantiation theories when the latter involve causal capacities or dispositions.
As Cummins observes: "property theories and transition theories fit together in an important way when target properties are dispositional. For when a system manifests a disposition, we have cause and effect (precipitating event causing manifestation), hence state transition" (1983: 21; see also 2000). So there is an item in a flat causal transition theory, for example, a dispositional property or capacity picked out by a psychological theory that describes the state transitions between a mind's input or triggering conditions for that mental disposition, the mental state or disposition itself, and the output or manifestation of that disposition. But the dispositional property also decomposes into simpler part properties and subcapacities via a dimensioned property instantiation theory.
Granted, causal transition theories are not equivalent to functional theories of causal roles and occupation. Statements of causal transitions are typically silent about whether a causal capacity is associated with a functional-role property that has a distinct role-playing or occupier property. Consequently, causal transition theories are not equivalent to causal-role theories of realization either. Indeed, for Cummins, realization is only tied to the dimensioned functional analysis, which is to say, the property instantiation theory and not the causal transition theory. And there are other points of difference. For example, Cummins believes that the primary data to be explained in psychology are capacities that are not typically specified as laws (2000: 123) . Scientific causal-role functionalists, on the contrary, assume that psychological laws are widespread, which is why they present their theory in terms of laws, or rather conjunctions of laws as captured in a Ramsey postulate (Block 1980) . Even so, the complementary work of flat and dimensioned functionalist theories of realization is very much like the complementary work of causal transition theories and property instantiation theories. For both accounts, the dimensioned mereology serves to explain the realization of a target functional property. More pessimistically (and even more speculatively), it is possible that the concept of realization satisfying one of these sets of desiderata must be different from the concept of realization that satisfies the other. While a certain kind of peaceful coexistence could persist were the preceding scenario to eventuate, to find that there was some kind of deep incompatibility between the desiderata of the Metaphysician of Mind and of the Cognitive Scientist would be a sort of intellectual disaster. So much so, we think, that one of the desiderata on the list of each should be that their view of realization should be at least consistent with (ideally, wellintegrated with) that of their counterpart (2007: 
V. Objections, Responses, and Rationales
I think that the synthesis of causal-role functionalism and the dimensioned functional analysis presents a viable theory of realization. But it raises some questions. I start with objections to the flat elements of the theory. Gillett discusses the complex instance COMBO of carbon atoms that is token identical with the diamond as well as a complex structural COMBO property whose powers enable it to play the role of the hardness of the diamond (note again the qualification mentioned in note 9). But he rejects such COMBO postulates on grounds that his dimensioned analysis can be reiterated at a more basic level: "Once again, it appears that COMBO is not identical to any of these specific microphysical properties/relations of fundamental particles," since fundamental properties and relations are "instantiated in particular microphysical individuals such as quarks, whilst COMBO is instantiated in the diamond" (2002: 320).
Defenders of the flat view could respond in kind by reiterating their constructivist methods at this more basic level. In particular, they could postulate another complex of quarks, say, QUARKO, that is token identical with the diamond and which possesses a structural QUARKO property that contributes its powers to the hardness of the diamond. However, I think Gillett is correct to see that such complexes must be explained by a deeper story about determination between proper parts and wholes. Still, the problem with Gillett's argument is that reiterating a dimensioned analysis at a more basic level only provides a reason for thinking that the dimensioned parts have a place in the world (and hence a place in a theory of realization).
That does not provide a reason for thinking that flat entities like COMBO have no place in the world (and hence no place in a theory of realization). So Gillett's point does not show that there is a problem with my compatibilist proposal that gives place to both flat and dimensioned theories.
Yet Gillett has more recently objected to the plausibility of flat causal-role theories rather than their compatibility with the dimensioned account. Specifically, he has argued against postulating entities like the role-playing COMBO-style structural property on the basis of a principle of simplicity:
Unfortunately, although structural properties may be an ideal fit for the demands of the Standard Picture [flat causal-role functionalism] there is a grave concern that arises when structural properties, or similar entities, are used to understand scientific cases. For there are good reasons to think that we should not accept the existence of COMBO, and other structural properties, given the strong ontological parsimony arguments against positing such properties (2007: 33). Viewing the matter inter-theoretically is the key. In particular, suppose one is also interested in a more general theory about voltage-sensitive gates and how they carry information, a broader perspective that includes voltage gates in electrical engineering as well as other fields outside neuroscience.
11 One might then find that the role-occupant distinction is very useful in forging a connection between the ontology of a theory about voltage-sensitive gates and the ontology of the neuroscientific theory about ion channels.
Specifically, expressing this broader perspective in terms of comprehensive functional realization (CFR): signaling through a voltage-sensitive gate F is realized by a role-playing open ion channel property G in a neuron s in virtue of more basic realizing part properties P 1 -P n of the neural components a 1 -a n . This is very much like saying that macro-hardness F is realized by the lattice-structure property G in the diamond object s in virtue of the more basic properties P 1 -P n of the constituent carbon atoms a 1 -a n , and very much like saying that processing a disjunctive argument F is realized by a structural property of logic gates G in a computer system s in virtue of the more basic properties P 1 -P n of the engineering component circuits a 1 -a n .
So while the postulation of role-playing entities may appear ontologically profligate, they actually play a central role in the broader practice of inter-theoretic unification by indicating what, within the domain of a lower-level theory, corresponds to the entities in a higher-level theory that have been targeted for explanation. There is no 'diamond' in the concepts and vocabulary of micro-chemistry, only in the macro theory. But there are carbon atoms and most importantly a complex lattice-structure COMBO of them that can be identified with or at least correlated with the diamond and thus explain its macro hardness by the lattice-structure property.
Likewise, there is no 'mind' in the concepts and vocabulary of electrical and computer engineering, only in psychology and computational psychology. But there are electrical and engineering components and most importantly a SYSTEM of engineering components that can be identified with or at least correlate with a mind and thus explain its ability to perform cognitive processes like formulating a disjunctive argument by a structural property of its logic gates. Such views are right in holding that we need an account of realization that gives a role to the properties of micro-entities and other parts of macroscopic objects, and that we do not get this in the sort of [flat] account presented so far. But the cure for this is not to count properties of parts of macroscopic objects as realizers of properties of the macroscopic objects. The instantiation of a realizer of a property should be sufficient for the instantiation of that property, and no property of a micro-entity that is part of a thing is such that its instantiation is sufficient for the instantiation of any of the properties of that thing. What is true is that the instantiation of a property of a micro-entity can be part of a macroscopic entity. What we have here is the realization of a property instantiation, not by another property instantiation, but by a microphysical state of affairs involving the instantiation of micro-properties in micro-entities. Such a state of affairs "makes real," constitutes, the occurrence of a property instance (2007: 32).
So Shoemaker says that realizers must supply a sufficient condition for what they realize, and hence Gillett's dimensioned theory is in error because it counts the proper parts of an object as realizers that, taken individually, do not supply a sufficient condition for what is realized.
What is sufficient instead is a larger "microphysical state of affairs" involving the assorted microphysical proper parts and their microphysical properties. Thus, in addition to his two flat accounts of property realization for single and coincident objects that make no mention of microphysical parts, Shoemaker develops an account of "micro-realization" employing microphysical states of affairs that contain microphysical parts and their properties.
I have two responses. First, a technical point, one might question whether realization should always involve sufficient conditions. This is the standard view, and I have assumed it in the past. Nevertheless, in order to account for the converse of multiple realization, I also have developed an account that treats realizers as INUS conditions (Endicott, 1994: 68-71) . My suggestion was that, instead of realization laws of the form: for any x, if x has G 1 then x has F 1 , the laws must include an additional base condition G 2 such that a difference in G 2 allows G 1 to determine some other property F 2 but not F 1 (the converse of multiple realizability). So let the realization law be: for any x, if x has G 1 & G 2 then x has F 1 . This makes G 1 an insufficient but necessary part of a sufficient condition. However, if F 1 is then multiply realized by properties other than the joint pair G 1 and G 2 , then the pair is not necessary, which now makes the original realizer G 1 an INUS condition --an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Even so I will not press this point, since I believe this difference with the standard sufficiency view ultimately turns on difficult and often interest-relative choices between what counts as "realizers" versus "background conditions" for their metaphysical production (ditto, of course, for the corresponding debate over "causes" versus "background conditions").
Second, and more important, granting the point about sufficiency, I read Gillett as maintaining that the basic realizing part properties P 1 -P n jointly determine the realized property F, meaning that their joint instantiation by the several proper parts suffices for the instantiation of the realized property F. In other words, Gillett can maintain the dimensioned realization law expressed earlier for functional part-whole realization (FPR): for any x and any y 1 , …, y n , if y 1 , …, y n are the proper parts of x, then if y 1 , …, y n have P 1 ,…,P n , then x has F. Perhaps Shoemaker intends to make a deeper metaphysical point that Gillett's dimensioned theory does not supply the right kind of micro object which, when it instantiates a microphysical property, is a sufficient condition for the realized macro object, when it instantiates the realized macro property. That, apparently, is why Shoemaker appeals to a complex microphysical "state of affairs" that contains microphysical property instances as parts. But, happily, the present picture of comprehensive functional realization provides the perfect analogue for Shoemaker's complex microphysical state of affairs, namely, a complex COMBO-style object that instantiates the role-player property G that determines F. Both Shoemaker's state of affairs and the present complex COMBO are constituted by microphysical parts, and both possess a property that is sufficient for the realization of F.
VI. Concluding Remarks
I close with some general remarks about why it is easy to overlook the complementary work of a flat functional role theory and a dimensioned functional theory, viewing them instead as theoretical competitors. First, in its popular second-order version, the flat functional theory appears to address the same hierarchy of nonreductive facts as the dimensioned theory by stating that there are two orders of properties, the functional properties associated with causal roles, and the role-playing occupiers. But, in response, the flat second-order theory does not yield the same hierarchy, as I explained earlier by the distinction between property "orders" and causal "levels."
Only the dimensioned theory addresses different causal levels, as befitting the different powers of parts versus wholes.
Second, it might seem that flat and dimensioned functionalist theories of realization are in competition because both are theories of determination. The role-player G determines F, and yet the joint work of the part properties P 1 ,…,P n also determines F. But, in response, on the synthesis I propose they determine the realized property in different ways, one being direct and the other indirect. The instantiation of the part properties P 1 ,…,P n by the subsystem parts a 1 -a n determines a complex COMBO-style object to have a role-playing property G that in turn determines the system s to have the functional property F. The determiners do not compete. They are different links in the great chain of being.
Third, it might seem as though flat and dimensioned functionalist theories of realization are in competition because they seem to answer the same philosophical problem, for example, the mind-body problem (how does the mind relate to the brain?), or the many-sciences problem (how does the ontology of a special science relate to the ontology of a more general science?).
But (ii), the question about inter-level relations between the mind and brain or the special and physical sciences. On the other hand, by addressing the how of realization, the dimensioned functionalist theory is primarily an attempt to answer (ii), the question about the inter-level
relations. Yet because the dimensioned theory is a theory of inter-level determination, it is not primarily an attempt to answer (i) about the nature of the entities so determined. Each theory thus speaks to a different aspect of the mind-body problem or the many-sciences problem. Of course, nothing I have said is intended to show that all flat and dimensioned theories of realization are compatible and complementary in the way described. But I think it is important to know that some theories are so compatible, especially when it concerns functionalist theories that have dominated discussions in the philosophy of mind. that a flat theorist may also count the mammalian and octopus eyes as different realizations. For example, one could claim that the structural property for the mammalian eye and the structural property for the octopus eye both play the same causal role as understood by a high-level psychological theory of vision which describes the pertinent visual function in terms of abstract information over shared processing items such as a cornea, pupil, and retina, even though the structural properties differ by a lower-level physiological theory that highlights their physical differences regarding the parts that constitute those structures (e.g., the photoreceptor cells in the octopus eye point toward the incoming light while those in a mammalian eye absorb light that is reflected from the back of the eye). See also Gillett 2003: 595, fn.12 , where he mentions why some philosophers believe that the two corresponding structural properties may differ even though they play the same causal role.
rejects those metaphysical supplements, as I discuss in section V. They enter only as part of a here liberalized flat story -still causally flat because the coincident object would exist at the same causal level n as the object it is coincident with -a story that combines with the basic dimensioned position in the larger picture represented by the now revised coincident-friendly version of comprehensive functional realization.
11 At one point Gillett mentions that an ion channel has the property of being a voltage-sensitive gate: "We know that, under appropriate background conditions, a potassium ion channel plays a key role in a neuron due to its property of being a voltage-sensitive gate contributing the backward-looking power of opening in response to a change in the charge of the surrounding cells " (2007: 28) . But Gillett does not address the significance that second-order functionalists will attach to that higher-level, more general perspective.
12 Carl Gillett has raised this issue in discussion, and a referee expressed much the same point. 
